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COMMENT
VERNONIA SCHOOL DISTRICT 47J v. ACTON:
FLUSHING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT-
STUDENT ATHLETES' PRIVACY INTERESTS Go DOWN THE DRAIN
Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or
for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is conta-
gious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt
for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites
anarchy.'
INTRODUCTION
In the fall of 1991, the government became a lawbreaker. This occurred
when a school district in Vernonia, Oregon imposed an unconstitutional man-
date upon middle and high school students wishing to participate in their ath-
letic programs. In order to compete, the students were required to submit to
random drug testing of their urine.
In an effort to support the federal government's "War on Drugs," the
Court sanctioned this illegal behavior when it failed to strike a balance be-
tween governmental power and individual rights. On June 26, 1995, the Court,
in Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, held constitutional under the Fourth
Amendment a district-wide policy authorizing random, suspicionless, urinalysis
drug testing of students who participate in the District's public school athletic
programs.' Despite the Court's efforts to follow what the Constitution pre-
scribes, the Court did not adhere to precedent and instead created its own
social agenda dictating how society should view the threat of drug use in our
public schools.
This Comment analyzes the Court's decision regarding the constitutional-
ity of the Vernonia School District's drug testing policy. Part I discusses the
Fourth Amendment in both the criminal search and administrative search con-
texts. Additionally, Part I examines the various cases in which the Court de-
veloped a balancing test to resolve whether an administrative search is reason-
able. Part II provides the factual background and procedural history of Acton.
Part III scrutinizes the Court's reliance on New Jersey v. T.L.0 4 as precedent
for upholding the District's drug testing program. It specifically addresses how
the majority's inaccurate application of T.L.O. undermines the Court's prior
1. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
2. 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995).
3. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2397.
4. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
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decisions, which held that full, intrusive, suspicionless searches were reason-
able if a compelling government interest beyond law enforcement was present.
Finally, this Comment argues that the Acton opinion represents an unclear and
unnecessary departure from Fourth Amendment standards. The decision effec-
tively strips public school students of their legitimate expectations of privacy
and security guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Scope of the Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution "guarantees the
privacy, dignity, and security of persons against certain arbitrary and invasive
acts by officers of the Government or those acting at their discretion."' This
language protects individuals from two types of governmental invasions:
"searches" and "seizures."6 A "search" occurs when a person's reasonable
expectation of privacy is infringed upon.7 A "seizure" of property occurs
when there is some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory
interest in that property.' In order to trigger Fourth Amendment protection
against unreasonable governmental intrusions, an intrusion, as a threshold
matter, must occur in an area where a citizen has a reasonable expectation of
privacy.' A reasonable expectation of privacy exists if a person has an expec-
tation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as objectively reason-
able.'0
5. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 613-14 (1989) (citing
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967)). The Court has espoused an exclusionary
remedy for violations of a defendant's constitutional rights. The first such decision was Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (holding that it was prejudicial error for a trial court to
refuse to return letters and documents to the accused, and to allow their use in his trial, when
obtained through a warrantless search conducted by a United States official under color of office).
The exclusionary doctrine was later applied to the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655
(1961) (holding that the exclusionary rule is enforceable against the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause, due to the broad scope of the Fourth Amendment's right of
privacy). This rule prohibits the use of evidence or testimony obtained by government officials
through means violative of the Constitution. Id. at 648. Therefore, all evidence obtained by law
enforcement officials through means lacking the constitutionally required degree of suspicion
necessary to proceed are deemed invalid and inadmissible at trial if the defendant can establish
that the evidence was obtained in an unconstitutional manner. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 245
n.13 (1983) ("In making a determination of probable cause the relevant inquiry is not whether
particular conduct is 'innocent' or 'guilty,' but the degree of suspicion that attaches to particular
types of non-criminal acts."). Likewise, evidence subsequently derived from evidence erroneously
obtained is inadmissible under the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine. Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471, 484, 488 (1963).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
7. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. at 616.
8. Id.
9. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967). A governmental intrusion is deemed
reasonable if the intrusion was predicated either upon the issuance of a warrant by a detached and
disinterested magistrate upon a showing of probable cause, Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573,
582 n.17 (1979), or for compelling reasons which would justify an exception to the warrant re-
quirement, McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 454 (1948). See generally 2 WAYNE
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT (2d ed. 1987) (dis-
cussing the Fourth Amendment in detail).
10. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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1. The Fourth Amendment in the Criminal Search Context
An intrusion is reasonable in the criminal search context when a war-
rant" to search is issued based upon a showing of probable cause and a de-
scription of the things or people to be seized. 2 Once presented with an affi-
davit explaining, with particularity, the reasons for the intrusion and a descrip-
tion of the premises, a neutral and detached magistrate signs a court order
issuing the warrant. 3 Probable cause to search exists when the facts and cir-
cumstances would cause a man of reasonable caution to believe that seizable
objects are located in the place to be searched. 4
The Court, however, carves out various exceptions to the warrant and
probable cause elements of the reasonableness requirement, which apply in
certain instances. The Court has not mandated warrants in searches: (1) while
in hot pursuit of a criminal suspect; 5 (2) if there is imminent destruction of
evidence; 6 (3) of automobiles; 7 (4) of items in plain view when an officer
is already at a lawful vantage point;" (5) incident to a lawful arrest; 9 (6) of
inventory pursuant to an arrest;2" (7) where consent has been given;2' and
(8) where probable cause is impracticable because the purpose of the search is
to satisfy some special need beyond law enforcement.22 Furthermore, in other
11. "A warrant assures the citizen that the intrusion is authorized by law, and that it is nar-
rowly limited in its objectives and scope." Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. at 622; see
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701 (1983) (stating that a seizure of personal property is per
se unreasonable when accomplished without a judicial warrant issued upon probable cause and
particularly describing items to be seized); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980) (stating
that searches and seizures within a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable).
12. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
13. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-15 (1948).
14. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 363-64 (1985) (citing Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132, 161 (1925)).
15. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 305 (1967).
16. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966) (holding that the need for evidence of
blood alcohol content, given the rate at which the body metabolizes alcohol, and the fact that the
arresting officer incurred delays in seeking medical treatment for the petitioner, justified taking a
blood sample without a warrant).
17. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154-55 (1925) (holding that officers are indemni-
fied for stopping and seizing automobiles reasonably believed to be illegally transporting contra-
band liquor).
18. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971).
19. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973) (noting that this exception extends
to searches of the person and to the area within the person's control being arrested).
20. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371-73 (1987) ("[Aln inventory search may be rea-
sonable under the Fourth Amendment even though it is not conducted pursuant to a warrant based
on probable cause."); Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 643 (1983) ("[Tjhe inventory search
constitutes a well-defined exception to the warrant requirement.").
21. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S.
582, 593-94 (1946).
22. CHARLES WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 144-293
(1986); Greg Knopp et al., Warrantless Searches and Seizures, 83 GEO. L.J. 692, 692 (1995). For
minimally intrusive searches, the Court reasons that a lesser degree of suspicion could still satisfy
the Fourth Amendment's ultimate mandate of "reasonableness." It would be excessive for the
Court to require a warrant, for example, every time a police officer briefly asks minimally intru-
sive questions of a person exhibiting suspicious behavior. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
Because the warrant exceptions grant police officers wide discretion, the Court created the
exclusionary rule to deter officers from abusing the exceptions. United States v. Calandra, 414
U.S. 338, 347-48 (1974).
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instances, the Court employs a balancing test,23 permitting searches and sei-
zures on a showing of less than probable cause, allowing reasonable suspicion
to sometimes suffice. 24 The Court balances the government's interests in
maintaining societal order and providing effective law enforcement against the
relative intrusiveness to the individual.25
2. The Fourth Amendment in the Administrative Search Context
Administrative searches, also called regulatory, civil, or "special needs"
searches, can occur in a variety of contexts, and the intrusiveness of such
searches can range from minimal to highly invasive.26 As in the criminal con-
text, these searches, too, can occur with or without a warrant and with or
without individualized suspicion. Administrative searches sometimes do not
require a warrant, because the purposes of a warrant would not be fur-
thered."' Ordinarily, a warrant is only useful for law enforcement purposes, in
which a full criminal search targets specific individuals.28 In an administrative
search, however, the goal is not law enforcement, but some other public policy
goal.29 For instance, the goal of municipal fire, health, and housing inspec-
23. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967).
24. Id. at 538; see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22 (sanctioning the use of a balancing test to
replace individualized suspicion).
25. Camara, 387 U.S. at 534-37; see Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-25 (discussing the use of a bal-
ancing test).
26. See Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2393 (1995) (deeming ran-
dom urinalysis drug testing of students who participate in athletics programs as an administrative
search); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 620-21, 630 (1989) (finding
drug and alcohol testing authorized by Federal Railroad Administration regulations to be adminis-
trative search); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (finding
United States Custom Service's drug testing of employees applying for promotion to positions
which involve stopping transportation of illegal drugs or requiring them to carry firearms at
nation's borders to be administrative search); New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987) (finding
warrantless administrative search of junkyard); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543
(1976) (holding vehicle stop at fixed checkpoint, Mexico-U.S. border, to determine citizenship to
be administrative search); Lesser v. Epsy, 34 F.3d 1301 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding warrantless ad-
ministrative search of animal dealer facilities); United States v. Branson, 21 F.3d 113 (6th Cir.)
(finding warrantless administrative search of auto repair shop), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 223 (1994);
In re Kelly-Springfield Tire Co., 13 F.3d 1160 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting administrative search con-
ducted on showing that OSHA violated); Winters v. Board of County Comm'rs, 4 F.3d 848, 853
(10th Cir. 1993) (finding warrantless administrative search of pawn shop), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
1539 (1994); United States v. Seslar, 996 F.2d 1058, 1063 (10th Cir. 1993) (deeming warrantless
random stop of trucks to determine whether trucks carrying commercial load as administrative
search); United States v. Johnson, 994 F.2d 740 (10th Cir. 1993) (noting administrative search of
taxidermy shop); Schaill v. Tippecanoe County Sch. Corp., 864 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1988) (hold-
ing random urinalysis testing of students who participate in interscholastic sports to be administra-
tive search); Brooks v. East Chambers Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 730 F. Supp. 759, (S.D. Tex.
1989), affd, 930 F.2d 915 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding urinalysis drug testing of students participating
in extra-curricular activities to be administrative search).
27. The Court analyzes the public interest involved:
In assessing whether the public interest demands creation of a general exception to the
Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, the question is not whether the public interest
justifies the type of search in question, but whether the authority to search should be
evidenced by a warrant, which in turn depends in part upon whether the burden of ob-
taining a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental purpose behind the search.
Camara, 387 U.S. at 533.
28. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. at 619.
29. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. at 606-09; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 660-61;
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tions is public safety;3" likewise, railroad employees and U.S. Customs Ser-
vice employees may be subject to drug and alcohol testing in the interest of
public safety.3
a. The Warrant & Probable Cause Requirements
A warrant supported by probable cause may be issued in an administrative
context. Unlike the criminal arena, however, administrative searches typically
are not subjected to a neutral, detached evaluation because the persons
searched are given notice that they are subject to such random searches. 2
Either a person has signed a consent form at some point prior to the search,33
or the very nature of the person's environment provides a lesser expectation of
privacy.34 In these instances, the need to check an arbitrary abuse of gov-
ernment discretion-the purpose of a warrant-is eliminated. Courts justify
this exception because random searches promote the special benefits of deter-
rence and accuracy. These benefits may be lost during the time necessary to
procure a warrant.35 If the search is reasonable, therefore, a warrant requiring
probable cause is not necessary to conduct an administrative search.
b. The Reasonableness Balancing Test
In the absence of a warrant or individualized suspicion, both criminal and
administrative searches can require a balancing of interests in determining
whether or not a search is reasonable. The Court again balances the privacy
and security interests of the individual against the government's interest in
conducting the search.36 In the criminal context, the government seeks indi-
vidual convictions; whereas in the administrative context, the government
seeks to uphold a regulation or policy providing for public safety.3 An im-
portant distinction between administrative and criminal searches is that in an
administrative search, the government's interests are not driven by law en-
forcement purposes. Because the government interest is clear, the Court has an
easier time fashioning the appropriate balancing test.3" The reasonableness
balancing test required for criminal searches is clearly distinguishable from the
Camara, 387 U.S. at 533.
30. Camara, 387 U.S. at 533-34.
31. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. at 606-09; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 660-61.
32. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. at 622.
33. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2389.
34. Id. at 2392-93; Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. at 628; Von Raab, 489 U.S.
at 672; New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 348 (1985).
35. See Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. at 623; T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340; Dono-
van v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 603 (1981); Camara, 387 U.S. at 533.
36. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. at 606-09; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 660-61.
37. See, e.g., Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. at 606-09 (discussing the public
policy goal of preventing alcohol and drug use by railroad employees, which had possibly caused
or contributed to a significant number of train accidents); Von Roab, 489 U.S. at 660-61 (discuss-
ing the public policy goal of preventing drug use by front line, drug interdiction Customs agents).
38. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. at 606-09, 620-21; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at
660-61; see Camara, 387 U.S. at 529.
19961
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reasonableness balancing test employed by the courts in administrative search-
es.
39
c. Application of the Reasonableness Balancing Test
In order to apply a reasonableness analysis in an administrative search
context, the Fourth Amendment first requires that a search occur.' In the
absence of a warrant, the search must then be distinguished from a criminal
search."' To determine if a search is administrative rather than criminal,
courts examine several factors. One characteristic demonstrating this difference
is the randomness of administrative searches, which means a low probability
for an abuse of discretion. Another is that the environment in which the search
is conducted merits a lower expectation of privacy. An additional distinguish-
ing characteristic of administrative searches is that the persons to be searched
have notice of the policy. Fourth, the purposes of requiring a warrant are not
served in the administrative context. Fifth, and perhaps most important, is that
such a search does not further a criminal investigation; therefore, the
government's interests go beyond normal law enforcement.
The final requirement of the reasonableness analysis is that the govern-
ment action be reasonable." Reasonableness "depends on all of the circum-
stances surrounding the search or seizure and the nature of the search or sei-
zure itself."43 If the degree of invasion is outweighed by the government's
need to search, the search is likely to be found reasonable.4 In making this
determination, it appears as though the Court has employed two standards of
review which can be labeled as: (1) legitimate interests, which satisfy mini-
mally intrusive searches;45 and (2) compelling interests, which justify highly
39. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. at 606-09; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 660-61;
see Camara, 387 U.S. at 529.
40. See Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. at 614-18; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 664-
65; see also California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988) (finding that a search of trash did not
constitute a search); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986) (finding that an aerial search did
not contitute a search). As stated above, a search is an infringement on an expectation of privacy
that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. at
616; see, e.g., Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 43; United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
This means that a government actor must invade a person's reasonable expectation of privacy.
While the Fourth Amendment applies to federal actors, it also applies to state actors through the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Fourteenth Amendment, therefore, prohibits an unreasonable invasion
of a person's reasonable expectation of privacy by state officials. See Elkins v. United States, 364
U.S. 206, 213 (1960); see also Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949) (determining that the
Constitution, by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures
by state officers).
41. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. at 620-21 (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483
U.S. 868, 873-74 (1987)) (stating that there are "'special needs' beyond normal law enforcement
that may justify departures from the usual warrant and probable-cause requirements").
42. See id. at 624-34.
43. Id. at 619 (citing United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985)).
44. See id.
45. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (upholding the detection and
detention of illegal aliens through checkpoint border stops).
In Martinez-Fuerte, government officials were permitted to stop, question, and visually
inspect the exterior of any vehicle. Id. at 558. However, the officials were not permitted to search
the interior of the vehicle or the occupants. Id. The Court reasoned that the heavy flow of traffic
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intrusive searches. 4
B. The Development of the Compelling Interest & Highly Intrusive Standard
of Review
1. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n47
Faced with the possibility that alcohol and drug abuse by railroad employ-
ees caused or contributed to a significant number of train accidents, the Feder-
al Railroad Administration (FRA) promulgated regulations" mandating blood
and urine toxicological tests of all employees involved in a "major train acci-
dent."'49 Under these regulations, the railroad has the additional duty "of col-
lecting samples for testing after an 'impact accident.""'5 Following an occur-
rence that triggers the railroad's duty to test, all crew members and covered
employees directly involved in the accident are taken to an independent medi-
cal facility for the collection of blood and urine samples.5 After collecting
the samples, the railroad sends them by prepaid air freight to the FRA labora-
tory for analysis. 2
The FRA also adopted regulations authorizing, but not requiring, railroads
to conduct breath and urine tests where, after a reportable accident or incident,
a supervisor has "reasonable suspicion" that an employee's acts or omissions
at the border justified stopping each car without reasonable suspicion. Id. at 557. In addition, the
Court recognized that the government's goal of deterring aliens at the border furthered the purpos-
es of conducting random searches. Id. To make this determination, the Court balanced what they
believed to be a minimal intrusion on the motorists' privacy, with the effectiveness of the pro-
gram, the ineffectiveness of alternatives, and the legitimate interests of society in controlling the
flow of illegal aliens into this country. Id. at 556-57; see also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,
663 (1979) (finding the questioning of all oncoming traffic at roadblock-type stops to be a mini-
mally intrusive method to promote the government's interest in maintaining highway safety);
Camara, 387 U.S. at 538 (authorizing suspicionless searches of residential and commercial build-
ings for fire, health, and safety violations). In Prouse, the Court found the intrusion of stopping an
automobile and detaining the driver in order to check his or her driver's license and the registra-
tion of the automobile to be an unreasonable intrusion when the driver is subsequently indicted for
illegal possession of a controlled substance in the absence of reasonable suspicion that a motorist
is unlicensed, or that an automobile is not registered. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663. The Court did
sanction states for stopping and questioning all oncoming traffic at roadblock-type stops even
though they involved less intrusion. Id.
46. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (finding testing of
railroad employees for drug use by urinalysis to be a highly intrusive invasion of privacy, yet
justified because of the government's compelling interest in preventing catastrophic train accidents
involving substantial casualties); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656
(1989) (finding the testing of United States Customs Service employees for drug use by urinalysis
to be a highly intrusive invasion of privacy, yet justified because of the government's compelling
interest in promoting safety and national security).
47. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
48. 49 C.F.R. § 219.101-.905 (1994).
49. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. at 609. Under the regulations, the definition
of a "major train accident" is any train accident involving "(i) a fatality, (ii) the release of hazard-
ous material accompanied by an evacuation or a reportable injury, or (iii) damage to railroad prop-
erty of $500,000 or more." Id. (citing 49 C.F.R. § 219.201(a)(1) (1987)).
50. Id. An "impact accident is a collision that results in a reportable injury, or in damage to
railroad property of $50,000 or more." Id. (citing 49 C.F.R. § 219.201(a)(2) (1987)).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 610 (citing 49 C.F.R. § 219.205(d) (1987)).
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contributed to the incident or to the severity of the accident.53 In addition, the
railroad administers these tests to employees who violate specific safety
rules.54 In all situations, the samples are only tested for alcohol and drug use,
and not for any other medical information." Significantly, the Court noted
that although test results are not intended to be released to drug enforcement
officials, the regulations do not expressly prohibit the release of such re-
sults.56
In reviewing the constitutionality of these regulations, the Court scruti-
nized the level of intrusion involved. The Court initially determined that the
collection and testing of urine intruded upon expectations of privacy that soci-
ety recognizes as reasonable, because the invasion affected the privacy inter-
ests of the employees' bodies.57 However, the Court continued to discount
this expectation by finding that the employees tested pursuant to these regula-
tions have long been the focus of regulatory concern, and that they therefore
possessed a diminished expectation of privacy." In balancing this intrusion
with the government's "compelling"59 interest in preventing disastrous train
accidents involving great human loss, the Court reasoned that the government
interest outweighed the intrusion.' The Court found persuasive FRA statistics
demonstrating the high incidence of drug and alcohol abuse in the industry,
the FRA's estimations concerning the extent of property damage, and the num-
ber of fatalities and injuries caused by such abuses.6 Likewise, the Court
53. Id. at 611 (citing 49 C.F.R. § 219.301(b)(2) (1987)).
54. Id. (citing 49 C.F.R. § 219.301(b)(3) (1987)). Sub-part D of the regulations, entitled
"Authorization to Test for Cause," also provides that a breath test may be conducted where a
supervisor has a "reasonable suspicion" that an employee is under the influence of alcohol, based
upon personal observations of the employee's appearance, behavior, speech, or body odor. Id.
(quoting 49 C.F.R. § 219.301(b)(1) (1987)). If impairment is suspected, urine tests may be re-
quired, but only if the decision to conduct such a test is made by two supervisors. Id. (citing 49
C.F.R. § 219.301(c)(2)(i) (1987)). Lastly, if drugs are suspected of causing impairment, one of the
supervisors making the determination must be specially trained in detecting drug intoxication. Id.
(citing 49 C.F.R. § 219.301(c)(2)(ii) (1987)).
55. Id. at 626.
56. Id. at 621 n.5 (stating that although the biological samples had never been released and
are not intended for release to drug enforcement officials, the procedures do not expressly prohibit
such release). In dicta, the Court implied that release to law enforcement authorities was unlikely.
Id. at 621.
57. Id. at 617.
58. Id. at 628.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 633.
61. Id. at 607. The Court referenced a study conducted by the FRA:
The FRA noted that a 1979 study examining the scope of alcohol abuse on seven major
railroads found that "[ain estimated one out of every eight railroad workers drank at
least once while on duty during the study year." In addition, "5% of workers reported to
work 'very drunk' or got 'very drunk' on duty at least once in the study year," and
"13% of workers reported to work at least 'a little drunk' one or more times during that
period." The study also found that 23% of the operating personnel were "problem drink-
ers," but that only 4% of these employees "were receiving help through an employee
assistance program, and even fewer were handled through disciplinary procedures."
Id. at 607 n.l (citations omitted). The FRA also reported that:
[Alfter a review of accident investigation reports from 1972 to 1983, "the nation's rail-
roads experienced at least 21 significant train accidents involving alcohol or drug use as
a probable cause or contributing factor," and that these accidents "resulted in 25 fatali-
ties, 61 non-fatal injuries, and property damage estimated at $19 million (approximately
[Vol. 73:2
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viewed the ineffectiveness of previous attempts to control such abuses as
dispositive of the reasonableness of maintaining these regulations.62 In a 6-2
decision upholding the constitutionality of the alcohol and drug testing regula-
tions, the Court held that under the totality of the circumstances, the search of
the employees satisfied the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness test.
63
2. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab'
Decided the same day as Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, Von Raab also
involved drug testing. 65 However, the program involved United States Cus-
toms Service employees.' In implementing the drug testing program, the
Commissioner of Customs authorized testing only for employees in positions
meeting one or more of three criteria: (1) employment involving front line
drug interdiction, (2) the possession of a firearm, or (3) the handling of "clas-
sified" material. 67 After an employee qualifies for a position covered by the
$27 million in 1982 dollars)."
Id. at 607 (citations omitted).
62. Id. at 607-08.
63. Id. at 634. Justices Marshall and Brennan dissented. Id. at 635-55. The dissent strongly
criticized the majority's cursory treatment of the Fourth Amendment's requirements. Id. at 637.
They argued that the majority unjustifiably dispensed with the probable cause requirement for the
search at issue. "Without the content which [that provision gives) to the Fourth Amendment's
overarching command that searches and seizures be 'reasonable,' the Amendment lies virtually
devoid of meaning, subject to whatever content shifting judicial majorities, concerned about the
problems of the day, choose to give to that supple term." Id.
Likewise, the dissent scrutinized the majority's insistence on widening the "special needs"
exception to the probable cause requirement. Id. at 640-41. Justice Marshall asserted that in doing
so, the majority had undertaken the final and necessary steps toward eliminating the probable
cause requirement altogether. Id. at 640. "[T]he majority substitutes a manipulable balancing in-
quiry under which, upon the mere assertion of a 'special need,' even the deepest dignitary and
privacy interests become vulnerable to governmental incursion." Id. at 640-41. The dissent main-
tained that the majority was interested only in results:
The fact is that the malleable "special needs" balancing approach can be justified only
on the basis of the policy results it allows the majority to reach. The majority's concern
with the railroad safety problems caused by drug and alcohol abuse is laudable; its cava-
lier disregard for the text of the Constitution is not. There is no drug exception to the
Constitution ....
Id. at 641. "Constitutional requirements like probable cause are not fair-weather friends, present
when advantageous, conveniently absent when 'special needs' make them seem not." Id. at 637.
Finally, the dissent suggested that the majority should have evaluated the FRA's testing
regime by using the traditional analytical framework condoned by the Court in cases involving
full-scale searches implicating the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 641-48. Specifically, Justice Marshall
commented that the majority should have first asked whether a search had taken place. Id. at 641-
42. Second, they should have inquired as to "whether the search was based on a valid warrant or
undertaken pursuant to a recognized exception to the warrant requirement." Id. at 642. Next, the
Court should have asked "whether the search was based on probable cause or validly based on
lesser suspicion because it was minimally intrusive." Id. Justice Marshall remarked that the final
question should have been whether the search was conducted in a reasonable manner. id.
The dissent concluded that the majority's constitutional framework for allowing such a
search was devoid of the "time-honored and textually based principles" which the Framers intend-
ed to include in the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 654-55.
64. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
65. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 660.
66. The United States Customs Service is a bureau of the Department of Treasury. Id. at
659.
67. Id. at 660-61. The Court reasoned that because the Customs Service is the nation's first
line of defense against the smuggling of illicit narcotics into the country, they could not perform
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Service's testing program, the Service advises the employee that final selection
is contingent upon satisfying the drug test.' An independent contractor then
contacts the employee to arrange a time and place for producing and collecting
the urine sample.' The contractor then tests the sample for the presence of
marijuana, cocaine, opiates, amphetamines, and phencyclidine." If an initial
screening test produces a positive result, the contractor conducts a second test
to confirm those results.7' If that test verifies the positive result, the contrac-
tor notifies the Agency, and the Agency dismisses the employee from the Ser-
vice.72 Unlike the regulations in Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, however,
the Court maintained that the Customs Service's rules expressly prohibited the
release of test results to law enforcement authorities.73
In analyzing the Customs Service's drug testing program, the Court first
acknowledged that the program implicated the Fourth Amendment, since the
tests invaded reasonable expectations of privacy.74 Next, because the intrusion
on the Custom Service's employees served special governmental needs beyond
the normal need for law enforcement, the Court applied the Fourth Amend-
ment balancing test for administrative searches." The Court then balanced the
employee's privacy expectations against the government's interest.76 The
Court's analysis focused on the fact that the Customs Service is the nation's
first line of defense against the smuggling of illicit narcotics into the
country.77 Therefore, the Court reasoned that a drug abusing front-line Cus-
toms employee is susceptible to bribes and blackmail against the government,
risking "extraordinary safety and national security hazards."" Additionally,
the Court determined that an armed Customs Service agent with impaired
perception posed a further danger to the general public.79
The government provided no evidence of an existing drug problem among
employees, nor did they contend that they even perceived such a problem.'
such a vital task for this country if they were abusing drugs. Id.
68. Id. at 661.
69. Id. Upon producing the sample, the employee signs a chain-of-custody form, the monitor
initials the form, seals the sample in a plastic bag, and sends it to a laboratory. Id.
70. Id. at 662. Phencyclidine is an anesthetic used in veterinary medicine, which is also used
illegally as a hallucinogen. It causes elevated blood pressure, rapid pulse, increased skeletal mus-
cle tone, and occasionally myoclonic jerks. AM. JuR. PROOF OF FAcTs, CYcOOPEDIC MEDICAL
DICTIONARY 1383 (3d ed. 1989) It is also referred to as "PCP or angel dust." Id.
71. Id. Confirmed positive results are reported to a "Medical Review Officer," defined as
'[a] licensed physician ... who has knowledge of substance abuse disorders and has appropriate
medical training to interpret and evaluate an individual's positive test result together with his or
her medical history, and any other relevant biomedical information."' Id. at 662-63 (quoting Man-
datory Guidelines for Federal Workplace Drug Testing Programs, 53 Fed. Reg. 11,970, 11,980
(1988)).
72. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 663.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 665.
75. Id. This was the same test adopted in Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. at 619-
20. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 6.65.
76. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665.
77. Id. at 668. The Court identified such smuggling as a "veritable national crisis" in law
enforcement. Id. (citing United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985)).
78. Id. at 674.
79. Id. at 671.
80. Id. at 673.
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Nonetheless, the Court held that the government's interest in ensuring that
front line interdiction customs agents are physically fit and possess unim-
peachable integrity and judgment,8' was compelling enough to justify such an
intrusion. 2
The Court next explained why customs employees have a diminished
expectation of privacy because of the nature of their positions within the Ser-
vice. 3 The Court reasoned that employees involved in drug interdiction
should expect such an invasion of privacy, because their health and fitness
bear directly on their ability to perform sensitive duties.8 4
In balancing both interests, the Court concluded that the government's
compelling interests outweighed the privacy interests of the Customs Service
employees. 5 Thus, in a 5-4 decision, the Court held that the Customs
Service's drug testing program met the reasonableness requirement of the
Fourth Amendment. 6
81. Id. at 670.




86. Id. at 679. Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Stevens, dissented:
The Court agrees that [the requirement that an employee produce excretion and give it to
the government for chemical analysis] constitutes a search for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment-and I think it obvious that it is a type of search particularly destructive of
privacy and offensive to personal dignity.
Id. at 680. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia found particularly persuasive the lack of evidence
demonstrating that a "real problem" of drug use existed within the Customs Service. Id. at 681.
He continued to disparage the majority's response to this evidentiary problem when they made the
blanket statement that "'[there is little reason to believe that American workplaces are immune
from [the] pervasive social problem' of drug abuse." Id. at 684. Justice Scalia remarked, "[I]f such
a generalization suffices to justify demeaning bodily searches, without particularized suspicion, to
guard against the bribing or blackmailing of a law enforcement agent, or the careless use of a
firearm, then the Fourth Amendment has become frail protection indeed." Id. Justice Scalia con-
cluded by criticizing the Court's blindness toward the Government's underlying reasons for requir-
ing such an invasive bodily intrusion:
What better way to show that the Government is serious about its "war on drugs" than
to subject its employees on the front line of that war to this invasion of their privacy
and affront to their dignity? ... I think it obvious that this justification is unacceptable;
that the impairment of individual liberties cannot be the means of making a point; that
symbolism, even symbolism for so worthy a cause as the abolition of unlawful drugs,
cannot validate an otherwise unreasonable search .... Those who lose because of the
lack of understanding that begot the present exercise in symbolism are not just the Cus-
toms Service employees, whose dignity is thus offended, but all of us-who suffer a
coarsening of our national manners that ultimately give the Fourth Amendment its con-
tent, and who become subject to the administration of federal officials whose respect for
our privacy can hardly be greater than the small respect they have been taught to have
for their own.
Id. at 686-87. Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, also dissented. ("Here, as in Skinner,
the Court's abandonment of the Fourth Amendment's express requirement that searches of the
person rest on probable cause is unprincipled and unjustifiable.") ld. at 679-80 (Marshall, J., dis-
senting).
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3. New Jersey v. T.L.. 7
In T.L.O., the Court upheld the constitutionality of a high school
principal's warrantless search of a student's purse without probable cause."8
The search was precipitated by a teacher observing the student smoking in a
school lavatory. The teacher took T.L.O. to the principal's office because
smoking in the lavatories violated a school rule.' Once in the office, the as-
sistant vice principal questioned T.L.O. about whether she had been smok-
ing.9' T.L.O. denied that she had been smoking, and claimed she did not
smoke at all.92 After this brief questioning, the principal asked T.L.O. to go
into his private office, where he searched her purse and found a pack of ciga-
rettes.93 As he reached into the purse for the cigarettes, he also noticed a
package of cigarette rolling papers.94 At that point, the principal associated
the possession of such materials with the use of marijuana.95 Therefore, he
proceeded to search T.L.O.'s purse thoroughly, intending to find further evi-
dence of drugs." The second search of a separate zippered compartment in
the purse revealed a small amount of marijuana, a pipe, empty plastic bags, a
number of one dollar bills, an index card which appeared to him to be a list of
students owing T.L.O. money, and two letters implicating T.L.O. in the distri-
bution of marijuana.97 The assistant vice principal then notified T.L.O.'s
mother, and turned the evidence of drug dealing over to the police.9"
Subsequently, the police requested that T.L.O. and her mother go to police
headquarters, where T.L.O. confessed to selling marijuana at school." Based
on the confession and the evidence seized by the assistant vice principal, the
state brought delinquency charges against T.L.O. in the county juvenile
court."l The juvenile court found the search of T.L.O.'s purse reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment, and sentenced her to a year's probation.'0 ' An
appellate court affirmed this finding. 2 T.L.O. appealed, and the Supreme
87. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).












100. Id. at 329. The principal also suspended T.L.O. for three days for smoking in a
nonsmoking area and seven days for possession of marijuana. Id. at 329 n.l. Based on T.L.O.'s
motion, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, found that the principal seized the
evidence of marijuana in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and thus, the court set aside the
seven-day suspension. Id. (citing T.L.O. v. Piscataway Bd. of Educ., No. C.2865-79 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Ch. Div., Mar. 31, 1980)).
101. Id. at 329-30.
102. Id. at 330. The appellate court afffirmed the lower court's finding that there had been no
Fourth Amendment violation. It vacated, however, the adjudication of the delinquency conviction
and remanded for a determination as to whether T.L.O. had knowingly and voluntarily waived her
Fifth Amendment rights before confessing. Id.
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Court of New Jersey reversed, ordering the suppression of the evidence seized
from T.L.O.'s purse.'0 3 New Jersey then petitioned for and was granted cer-
tiorari in the United States Supreme Court."
In its opinion, the Court recognized that the Fourth Amendment prohibits
unreasonable searches and seizures by public school officials. 5 The Court
focused next on balancing T.L.O.'s legitimate expectations of privacy and
personal security against the school's need to maintain order"" and an envi-
ronment conducive to learning.' Acknowledging the value of preserving the
informality of the student-teacher relationship' 0 and the need for swift disci-
pline in schools,"9 the Court concluded that while students have an expecta-
tion of privacy, they nonetheless have a diminished one."' Since the princi-
pal searched the zippered compartment with individualized suspicion of crimi-
nal activity, and the intent to further law enforcement goals, the Court ana-
lyzed the intrusion as a criminal, rather than an administrative search."' The
Court first examined "'whether the ... action was justified at its incep-
tion."""' Second, the Court examined whether the search "'was reasonably
related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the
first place.""' 3
In applying this test, the Court considered how T.L.O. had been accused
of smoking, and had denied the accusation."' The Court explained that under
those circumstances, a determination of whether T.L.O. possessed cigarettes
103. Id.
104. Id. at 331.
105. Id. at 333-34. The Court further stated, "'[Tlhe basic purpose of [the Fourth] Amend-
ment ... is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by gov-
ernment officials."' Id. at 335 (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967)).
The Court determined that since school officials are subject to the commands of the First
Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the concept of school
officials acting as parents, and not as the state, when they search students "is in tension with con-
temporary reality and the teachings of [the] Court." Id. at 336. "[T]he Court has recognized that
'the concept of parental delegation' as a source of school authority is not entirely 'consonant with
compulsory education laws."' Id. (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 662 (1977)). See
generally 59 AM. JUR. 2D Parent and Child §§ 10-22, at 75-76 (1987) (describing the rights,
duties, and authority of parents over their children, and the rights, duties, and authority of persons
acting in loco parentis).
106. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341.
107. Id. at 340; see Knopp et al., supra note 22, at 763-64 (discussing how the Court allowed
the state to dispense with the warrant and probable cause elements when special needs exist, and
instead, balanced the government's interests against the intrusion on individual privacy).
108. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340.
109. Id. at 329.
110. See id. at 339-40. In striking the balance, the Court determined that in the school setting,
the restrictions to which searches by public authorities are ordinarily subject require some easing.
Id. at 340. In addition, the Court noted that in a school setting, "some modification of the level of
suspicion of illicit activity [is] needed to justify a search." Id.
111. See id. at 341.
112. Id. at 341 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)). The Court stated that "a
search of a student by a teacher or other school official will be 'justified at its inception' when
there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student
has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school." Id. at 341-42.
113. Id. at 341 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20).
114. Id. at 345.
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was relevant to the charges against her. '5 Possession of cigarettes by T.L.O.,
the Court reasoned, would both corroborate the accusation that T.L.O. had
been smoking and undermine the credibility of T.L.O.'s defense to the charge
of smoking."6 Thus, the Court determined that if the assistant vice principal
had a reasonable suspicion that T.L.O. had cigarettes in her purse, then the
search was justified and reasonably related to the circumstances which justi-
fied the intrusion at the outset."
' 7
The Court's conclusion that the first search was reasonable prompted them
to analyze whether the second search for marijuana, after the pack of ciga-
rettes was located, was reasonable."' The Court found that the discovery of
the rolling papers gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that T.L.O.'s purse con-
tained marijuana, which in turn allowed the assistant vice principal to search
T.L.O.'s purse further."9 The Court concluded that it was not unreasonable
to extend the search to a separate zippered compartment of the purse and
examine the contents of that compartment. 20 Therefore, the search of
T.L.O.'s purse was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 2'
II. VERNONIA SCHOOL DISTRICT 47J V. ACTON
22
A. Facts and Procedural History
In the fall of 1991, James Acton, then in the seventh grade, signed up to
play football at his middle school. 23 However, school officials would not
allow Acton to participate because Acton and his parents refused to sign con-
sent forms authorizing the school to conduct a drug test of Acton's urine.1 24
Vernonia School District 47J ("the District") operates one high school and
three grade schools in the logging community of Vernonia, Oregon."z The
District had not experienced a problem with drugs until the mid-to-late 1980s,
when teachers and administrators observed a sharp increase in drug use.'26
In support of their observations, high school teachers and administrators
offered testimony that they had witnessed students discussing their attraction
to the drug culture.'27 During this time, students became increasingly rude
115. Id.
116. Id. The Court stated, "The relevance of T.L.O.'s possession of cigarettes to the question
whether she had been smoking and to the credibility of her denial that she smoked supplied the
necessary 'nexus' between the item searched for and the infraction under investigation." Id.
117. Id. at 345-46.
118. Id. at 347.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 347-48.
122. 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995).
123. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2390.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 2388. Vernonia, Oregon has a population of approximately 3,000, including those
living within or near the city limits. Acton v. Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 796 F. Supp. 1354, 1356
(D. Or. 1992).
126. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2388.
127. Id. Allegedly, the organizations which formed within the "drug culture" adopted names
such as the "Big Elks" and the "Drug Cartel." Acton, 796 F. Supp. at 1356. "Loud 'bugling' or
'head butting' were the calling cards of these groups." Id.
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during class, and used profanity more often.' This led to a drastic increase
in the number of disciplinary referrals, and several students were suspend-
ed.
29
In addition, the District believed that student high school athletes were not
only involved in such drug use, but were also the leaders of the high school's
"drug culture."'30 The District felt that drug use could increase "the risk of
sports-related injuries."'' For example, the high school football and wres-
tling coach observed "a severe sternum injury suffered by a wrestler, [as well
as] various omissions of safety procedures and misexecutions by football play-
ers.' 32 The coach did not attribute these incidents to other possible causes,
such as aggressive play, nervousness, or mere misexecutions caused by the
opponent or opposing team. Instead, he attributed the incidents to drug
use.
133
Initially, the District offered special classes, speakers, and presentations
designed to educate students about the harmful effects of drug use. 34 How-
ever, after the District found these measures ineffective, they implemented a
"Student Athlete Drug Policy" ("the Policy"). 35 The stated purpose of the
Policy was "to prevent student athletes from using drugs, to protect their
health and safety, and to provide drug users with assistance programs."'1
36
Under the Policy, all students participating in school sponsored athletics, and
their parents, are required to sign a form consenting to the student's urine
testing. 37 At the beginning of the fall, winter, and spring sports seasons, the
District tests athletes participating in sports for that season.' 3 In addition,
during each week of the season, ten percent of the athletes from the entire
athletic population for that season are randomly selected for testing.' 39 Ath-
letes selected for testing are notified and tested later the same day."4
Before administering the tests, the District requires each student to com-
plete a "specimen control form which bears an assigned number."' 4' At this
time, students must reveal all prescription medications that they are taking,
and show proof by providing a copy of the prescription or a doctor's authori-
zation."
128. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2388.
129. Id. The Court recognized that "[b]etween 1988 and 1989 the number of disciplinary
referrals in Vernonia schools rose to more than twice the number reported in the early 1980's." Id.
130. Id. at 2388-89 (citing Acton, 796 F. Supp. at 1357).




135. The Court found that there had been "unanimous" parental approval for the Policy,
which had been presented for consideration at a "parent input night." Id. The Policy applied to all
student athletes. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. "Approximately 60-65% of the high school students and 75% of the elementary
school students participate in district sponsored athletics." Acton, 796 F. Supp. at 1356.




142. Id. For example, the form would require the student to reveal prescribed medication for
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An individual student is then accompanied by an adult monitor of the
same sex into an empty locker room, where the student produces a sam-
ple. 43 The boys produce a sample at a urinal, remaining fully clothed with
their backs to the monitor.'" The girls produce samples in an enclosed bath-
room stall, where a monitor listens for the normal sounds of urination, but
does not visually observe the student.'45 The monitor checks the sample for
temperature and tampering."4 The monitor then transfers the urine to a
vial.
147
Thereafter, the District sends all samples to an independent laboratory for
testing." The laboratory tests every sample for the presence of marijuana,
cocaine, and amphetamines."4 The District permits the laboratory to send
test reports to the superintendent of the District, and to give the test results to
the District by telephone "after the requesting official recites a code confirm-
ing his authority." 50 The superintendent, principals, vice-principals, and ath-
letic directors all have access to the test results. 5'
Once a sample tests positive, the lab confirms the result by administering
a second test."2 If the sample tests negative the second time, no further ac-
tion is taken.'53 However, if the sample tests positive, the school principal
meets with the student and his or her parents. 5 4 The student then receives
the option of entering a six week drug assistance program (which requires
weekly urinalysis), or being suspended from athletics for the remainder of the
current and next athletic seasons."' Students selecting the latter option are
retested at the beginning of the next athletic season for which they are eligi-
ble. "'56 If a student violates the policy a second time, he or she is automati-
cally suspended from participation in athletics for the remainder of the current
and next athletic seasons.' 7 If a student violates the policy a third time, he
or she is suspended for the current and next two athletic seasons.'58
James Acton and his parents refused to consent to the District's drug
testing procedures.'59 Instead, they filed suit in United States District Court
for the District of Oregon, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from
epilepsy, AIDS, or birth control pills. See id.
143. Id.




148. Id. "The laboratory procedures are 99.94% accurate." Id.
149. Id. "Other drugs, such as LSD, may be screened at the request of the District, but the
identity of a particular student does not determine which drugs will be tested." Id. The identity of
a student who produces a sample is not revealed to the laboratory. Id.
150. Id. Test results "are not kept for more than one year." Id.
151. Id.
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enforcement of the Policy, on the grounds that it violated the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments and Article I, section 9 of the Oregon Constitu-
tion."6 At the conclusion of a bench trial, the district court dismissed the ac-
tion, denying each claim on the merits.16' The Actons appealed the decision
and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the
policy violated both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and the Oregon
Constitution. 62 The court reasoned that the students in the Vemonia School
District had legitimate expectations of privacy in their excretory functions.
Further, neither a student's participation in interscholastic athletics nor a
student's use of the school's locker rooms, diminished a student's expectation
of privacy. 63 The court determined that the District's interest in reducing
drug use was not compelling enough to justify the highly intrusive random
tests of the students' urine.' The District appealed to the Supreme Court.
B. Supreme Court Decision
1. Majority Opinion
The majority opinion, written by Justice Scalia, held that the Vernonia
School District's student-athlete drug policy did not violate the student's feder-
al or state constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches, as re-
quired by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and Article I, section 9 of
the Oregon Constitution.'65 First, the majority opinion acknowledged that the
District had determined that athletes in Vernonia played a large role in con-
tributing to the use of drugs in the District's high school." The Court refer-
enced several injuries sustained by high school athletes, which school officials
attributed to drug use.'67 In addition, the Court noted the District's perception
of a sharp increase in disciplinary problems."6
The Court next addressed whether under the Fourth Amendment, pursuant
to the Fourteenth Amendment, the constitutional guarantee to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures extended to the actions of state offi-
cials." 9 In answering this question, the Court turned to precedent and
160. Id. The Oregon Constitution provides in pertinent part:
No law shall violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable search, or seizure; and no wan-ant shall issue but upon
probable cause, supported by oath, or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.
OR. CONST. art. 1, § 9.
161. Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 796 F. Supp. 1354, 1368 (D. Or. 1992). The court
found that the record contained "ample evidence" to substantiate the District's concern that the
classroom disciplinary problems were being caused by drug and alcohol abuse. Id. at 1367. Addi-
tionally, the court reasoned that the program would most likely repress the District's problem. Id.
at 1363.
162. Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 23 F.3d 1514, 1527 (9th Cir. 1994).
163. Id. at 1525.
164. Id. at 1526.
165. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2397.
166. Id. at 2388.
167. Id. at 2389.
168. Id. at 2388. The Court relied on the district court's assessment that "[dlisciplinary prob-
lems had reached 'epidemic proportions."' Id. at 2389.
169. Id. at 2390 (citing Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 213 (1960) (holding that this
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concluded that the "state compelled collection and testing of urine, [as re-
quired] by the [District's] Policy constitutes a 'search' subject to the demands
of the Fourth Amendment.'
70
After establishing that the District's urine collection constituted a search
under the Fourth Amendment, the majority addressed whether individualized
suspicion is necessary for a Fourth Amendment analysis in an administrative
search context. 7' The majority conceded that T.L.O. was based on individu-
alized suspicion of wrong-doing; however, the Court explained that "the
Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of such suspicion.' 7 2
The Court noted that since its decision in T.L.O., it had upheld suspicionless
searches and seizures in an administrative context.
7 3
The fourth issue discussed by the majority was the nature of the privacy
interest involved in the search.17  The Court emphasized that the Fourth
Amendment only protects expectations of privacy that society recognizes as
legitimate. 75 In analyzing the interests of the students in Acton, the Court
noted that the reasonableness inquiry mandated by the Fourth Amendment
could not "disregard the school's custodial and tutelary responsibility for chil-
dren."'76 Therefore, the majority found that students have a legitimate, yet
diminished, expectation of privacy."7 Moreover, student-athletes have an
even lesser expectation of privacy.
7
1
guarantee is extended to searches and seizures by state officers)); id. (citing New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 333-34 (1985) (finding that public school officials are state officers)).
170. Id. (citing Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. at 617; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at
665).
171. ld. at 2391.
172. Id. (citing T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340, 341).
173. Id. Examples cited were Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n for its drug testing of railroad
employees involved in train accidents, and Von Raab's drug testing of armed customs officials in-
volved in drug interdiction. Id. Also cited were the maintainence of "automobile checkpoints look-
ing for illegal immigrants and contraband," United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566-
67 (1976), and looking for drunk drivers, Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444,
455 (1990). Id.
174. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2391.
175. Id. (citing T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 338).
176. Id. at 2392. "[A] proper educational environment requires close supervision of school-
children, as well as the enforcement of rules against conduct that would be perfectly permissible if
undertaken by an adult." Id. (citing T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339).
177. Id. Interestingly, as the Court made this determination that public school officials main-
tain a large degree of control over the actions and conduct of students, they also explained how
this does not constitutionally create a duty for those same officials to protect the students. Id. (cit-
ing DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989)).
178. Id. at 2392-93. The majority stated:
School sports are not for the bashful. They require "suiting up" before each practice or
event, and showering and changing afterwards. Public school locker rooms, the usual
sites for these activities, are not notable for the privacy they afford. The locker rooms in
Vemonia are typical: no individual dressing rooms are provided; shower heads are lined
up along a wall, unseparated by any sort of partition or curtain; not even all the toilet
stalls have doors.
Id. Furthermore:
By choosing to "go out for the team," [athletes] voluntarily subject themselves to a
degree of regulation even higher than that imposed on students generally. In Vernonia's
public schools, they must submit to a preseason physical exam, . . . they must acquire
adequate insurance coverage or sign an insurance waiver, maintain a minimum grade
point average, and comply with any "rules of conduct, dress, training hours and related
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The majority then scrutinized the character of the intrusion posed by
urinalysis.7 9 The Court explained that the degree of intrusion depends on
how the production and collection of the urine is monitored.") The Court
determined that the privacy interests involved in the collection of urine sam-
ples were not significant.'' The majority found important that under the
District's policy, male students produce their samples against a wall, fully
clothed, and that the female students provide their samples behind an enclosed
stall. ' 2 Thus, these conditions are identical to those typically encountered in
public rest rooms, which are used by men, women, and students on a daily
basis. 3 The Court further noted that another privacy-invasive aspect of uri-
nalysis is the information it discloses about the person's body and the mate-
rials they have ingested. 4 The majority believed this intrusion was permit-
ted, because the urine is tested only for drugs, and not for whether the student
is epileptic, pregnant, or diabetic.8 5
Finally, the majority examined the nature of the District's interests."'
Instead of following the Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n and Von Raab re-
quirement of a "compelling" government interest, the majority explained that
this phrase "describes an interest which appears important enough to justify
the particular search at hand, in light of other factors which show the search to
be relatively intrusive upon a genuine expectation of privacy."'8 7 Therefore,
the Court reasoned that whether the District's concern was important enough
was of no consequence, because it had been met.' Furthermore, the Court
explained that the individualized suspicion requirement established in Railway
Labor Executives' Ass'n could be set aside if the District demonstrated an
"immediate" concern, meaning if their concerns required prompt action.'8 9
The majority believed that deterring drug use by the nation's schoolchildren
was important enough."9 They did not, however, address whether the
District's concerns needed to be addressed with any sort of urgency. Regard-









185. Id. But see supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text (explaining that students were
required to disclose any medications they were taking).
186. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2394.
187. Id. at 2394-95.
188. Id. at 2395.
189. Id.
190. Id. The majority stated:
School years are the time when the physical, psychological, and addictive effects of
drugs are most severe. "Maturing nervous systems are more critically impaired by intox-
icants than mature ones are; childhood losses in learning are lifelong and profound";
"children grow chemically dependent more quickly than adults, and their record of re-
covery is depressingly poor."
Id. (quoting Richard A. Hawley, The Bumpy Road to Drug-Free Schools, 72 PHI DELTA KAPPAN
310, 314 (1990)).
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less, the Court concluded that the nature and immediacy of the government's
concerns were sufficient. 9'
In balancing the students' privacy and security interests against the
District's interests, the Court found the latter to outweigh the former, and held
the Policy to be "reasonable and hence constitutional."''
2. Concurring Opinion
Written by Justice Ginsburg, the concurring opinion agreed with the
majority's decision, but questioned whether the Policy adopted by the Verno-
nia School District could constitutionally be imposed not only on those stu-
dents seeking to engage in scholastic athletics, but on all students required to
attend school.'93
3. Dissenting Opinion
Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices Stevens and Souter, strongly dissent-
ed, criticizing the majority for ignoring the individual suspicion require-
ment.'94 Justice O'Connor explained that the Court overlooked this require-
ment on "policy grounds."' 95 She admonished such an approach by stating
that because blanket searches can potentially be conducted of many people,
they present a greater threat to liberty than suspicion-based searches, because
they affect only one person at a time.' However, the dissenters emphasized
that whether blanket searches are better than searches based on individualized
suspicion is not the issue."97 They claimed that the decision "is not open to
judges or government officials to decide on policy grounds which is better and
which is worse."'98 In support of their assertion, the dissent then discussed
how precedent had established that "mass, suspicionless searches [were] gener-
ally considered per se unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amen-
dment."'" The dissenters added that while there were exceptions to this rule,
such exceptions only apply when a suspicion-based regime is ineffectual.'
Justice O'Connor concluded that this was not the situation in Acton.2°'
191. Id.
192. Id. at 2396.
193. Id. at 2397 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
194. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
195. Id. "In making these policy arguments... the Court sidesteps powerful, countervailing
privacy concerns." Id. "First, [the majority) explains that precisely because every student athlete is
being tested, there is no concern that school officials might act arbitrarily in choosing who to test.
Second, a broad-based search regime, the Court reasons, dilutes the accusatory nature of the
search." Id.
196. Id. (citing Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 365 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 2398.
200. Id.
201. Id. The dissent then detailed an historical analysis beginning with Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). Justice O'Connor stated, "The Carroll Court's view that blanket
searches are 'intolerable and unreasonable' is well-grounded in history." Acton, 115 S. Ct at 2398.
In addition, Justice O'Connor stated that this has been confirmed in an exhaustive analysis of the
original meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Id. (citing William J. Cuddihy, The Fourth Amend-
ment Origins and Original Meaning (1990) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate
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The dissenters criticized the majority's finding that accusatory suspicion-
based searches are ineffectual, because it was not based on the reality of pub-
lic schools."2 The dissent noted that the District's disciplinary scheme listed
many offenses that students are punished for, and therefore, suspicion-based
drug testing for student athletes could easily have been added to the list. 3
The dissent, referring to the evidence introduced by the District to justify
suspicionless testing as a great irony, pointed out that such evidence consisted
of stories of individual, identifiable students conducting themselves in a man-
ner which plainly gave rise to reasonable suspicion.0 4 For example, drug
paraphernalia was confiscated on school grounds, and some teachers allegedly
observed students using drugs at a local cafe across the street from the high
school.0 5 Moreover, since the impetus for the drug testing policy was to
combat the rise in drug-related disorder and disruption in the classrooms, the
dissent criticized the District for not simply testing those students causing the
disruptions.2 °" The dissent concluded that intrusive blanket searches of stu-
dents-most of whom are innocent-sends the wrong message.
The final issue raised by the dissent was the lack of evidence in the court
record of a drug problem in the Washington Grade School which James Acton
attended." Indeed, three of the four witnesses who testified to drug-related
incidents were teachers or coaches at the high school, and the fourth witness
had been the principal at the high school prior to implementation of the Poli-
cy.
209
The Justices concluded that "the greatest threats to our constitutional
freedoms come in times of crisis, '2'0 and that here, the Policy implemented




The United States Supreme Court's decision in Acton is but another case
which marks the erosion of the fundamental constitutional requirement that all
searches satisfy the reasonableness test of the Fourth Amendment. Rather than
School)). The dissent noted that mass, suspicionless searches, are generally unreasonable in the
criminal context. Id. at 2400. "As stated, a suspicion-based search regime is not just any less
intrusive alternative; the individualized suspicion requirement has a legal pedigree as old as the
Fourth Amendment itself, and it may not be easily cast aside in the name of policy concerns." Id.
at 2403.
202. Id. at 2402-03.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 2403.
205. Acton, 796 F. Supp. at 1356-57.
206. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2406.
207. Id. at 2405. "[Suspicionless testing] sends a message to children that are trying to be
responsible citizens... that they have to prove that they're innocent .... and I think that kind of
sets a bad tone for citizenship." Id. (quoting the testimony of Acton's father, Tr. at 9 (Apr. 29,
1992)).
208. Id. at 2406.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 2407. The "crisis" the Justices are referring to is the District's drug problem.
211. Id.
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protect the privacy and security interests of student athletes in the Vemonia
School District, the majority authorized highly intrusive, random, suspicionless
searches based on less than compelling interests.
Relying on its prior decision in New Jersey v. T.L.O.,2 2 the Acton ma-
jority held that children in school have a lower expectation of privacy than
other persons in our society." 3 In addition, the Court cited T.L.O. for the
proposition that "special needs" exist in the public school setting, thereby
alleviating the practicability of a warrant." 4 Justice Scalia concluded that be-
cause the Court in T.L.O. authorized a warrantless search of a high school
student's purse without probable cause, the search in Acton had to be upheld
because the District's twofold interest-maintaining order and discipline in the
classroom and athletic safety--outweighed the privacy and security interests of
the students.2 5 This misinterpretation resulted in a violation of the Vernonia
student-athletes' constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches
under the Fourth Amendment.
At first glance, T.L.O. appears relevant to the Court's reasoning and deci-
sion in Acton.2 6 The Court certainly relied on T.L.O. when deciding the con-
stitutionality of the drug testing program at issue in Acton."7 T.L.O. involved
a search of a student," 8 and the degree of privacy accorded students.219
Since Acton also involved a search of a student, T.L.O. would seem control-
ling. However, while T.L.O. is instructive regarding the expectations of priva-
cy in a school environment, a close examination of T.L.O. demonstrates that
the two cases have different legal significance. '
The majority's reliance on T.L.O. is misplaced. T.L.O. involved a criminal
search; Acton, however, involved an administrative case. Although the search
of a purse in T.L.O. was highly intrusive, it nonetheless was not random or
suspicionless. An individual student was targeted on reasonable suspicion." °
Furthermore, the search uncovered marijuana, and the student suffered crimi-
nal penalties.22 ' The T.L.O. school officials conducting the search for mari-
212. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
213. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2392.
214. Id. at 2391.
215. Id. at 2395-96.
216. See id. at 2386.
217. Throughout the Acton opinion, the Court cited T.L.O. to support their findings of fact
and conclusions of law. For example, the Court cited T.L.O. for the proposition that the Fourteenth
Amendment extends the constitutional guarantees of the Fourth Amendment to searches and sei-
zures by public school officials. Id. at 2390. The Court also cited T.L.O. to establish that in the
public school setting, "special needs" exist, thereby alleviating the practicability of a warrant. Id.
at 2391. In addition, the Court explained that a school search based on less than probable cause
was reasonable in T.L.O. Id. at 2391. The Court emphasized that in T.L.O. they rejected the notion
that public schools, like private schools, exercise only parental power over their students. Id. The
Court explained further that such a proposition "is not entirely consonant with compulsory educa-
tion laws" and is "inconsistent with [the Court's] prior decisions treating [public] school officials
as state actors for purposes of the Due Process and Free Speech Clauses." Id. at 2392 (citations
omitted). Finally, the Court cited T.L.O. for the proposition that students generally have a lesser
expectation of privacy than other members of the population. Id.
218. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 328.
219. Id. at 326.
220. Id. at 347.
221. Id. at 328-29.
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juana were not furthering a special governmental need beyond law enforce-
ment; the purpose and consequence of the search was criminal. This raised the
question of whether school discipline was a special need in T.L.O. The answer
is yes, with respect to the principal's search for cigarettes. However, the char-
acter of the second search for marijuana was undoubtedly criminal.
The warrant exception recognized in T.L.O. is not due to any administra-
tive aspect of the search, but rather is an extension of Terry v. Ohio.222 The
Court's reliance on T.L.O. is flawed because T.L.O. applied Terry's reason-
ableness test rather than an administrative search analysis.223 The Terry deci-
sion authorized limited, warrantless searches of individuals, even when the
purpose of a warrant would be furthered, on a reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity, usually combined with warrant impracticability and a lesser expecta-
tion of privacy.22 Terry only authorized such limited searches on a reason-
able and articulable individualized suspicion of criminal activity; it never
authorized a highly intrusive suspicionless search of the kind involved in
Acton. Despite the temptation to combine these school search cases, they are
factually and legally quite different. Because T.L.O. is a criminal search case,
it is not controlling in an analysis of the constitutionality of Acton's adminis-
trative search; therefore, the Court's reliance on T.L.O. is misplaced.
In addition, by allowing such a highly intrusive search without individual-
ized suspicion, the majority ignored the guiding principles established by pre-
cedent, concerning the proper interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.225
Professor Thomas Clancy argues that the Court "has failed to attend to the
basic task of understanding the [Fourth] Amendment. The Court must return to
the fundamentals: history does provide guidance; the Fourth Amendment was
designed to protect individual liberty; reasonableness does have meaning; and
individualized suspicion is a core component of reasonableness. '226
In addition, as the Acton dissent noted, it is a "great irony" that the evi-
dence introduced by the District to justify suspicionless testing consisted of
incidents recanting "particular, identifiable students acting in ways that plainly
gave rise to reasonable suspicion.""22 The District argued on the one hand
that individualized suspicion was impracticable, then on the other hand argued
that officials were able to identify particular students-the individual athletes.
Several Justices focused on this flawed reasoning in the District's oral argu-
ment; this inconsistency remains unresolved.228
222. 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (holding that a limited, protective, pre-arrest search for weapons by
the police was reasonable if a reasonably prudent person in the same circumstances would justifi-
ably believe the suspect posed a danger).
223. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341-42.
224. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30-31.
225. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 147 (1925) ("The Fourth Amendment does
not denounce all searches and seizures, but only such as are unreasonable.").
226. Thomas K. Clancy, The Role of Individualized Suspicion in Assessing the Reason-
ableness of Searches and Seizures, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 483, 635 (1995).
227. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2403.
228. See Oral Arguments at 6, Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995) (No.
94-590).
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The majority's decision also ignores the Court's prior decisions in Rail-
way Labor Executives' Ass'n and Von Raab. These cases authorized full,
intrusive, suspicionless searches, which demonstrated an overwhelming depar-
ture from the Constitution's original definition of reasonableness: a warrant
supported by probable cause.229 Nonetheless, these searches were reasonable
in light of a compelling government interest beyond law enforcement. Like-
wise, because the District's urinalysis policy is highly intrusive, the District
must demonstrate a compelling interest to survive a constitutional challenge. A
legitimate or important interest is insufficient. Examples of compelling inter-
ests include railway collisions, as in Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, and
drug addicted, armed employees involved in front line drug interdiction, as in
Von Raab. As the Ninth Circuit correctly explained, "The extreme dangers and
hazards involved in the prior cases are simply not present here .... [The risk
of athletic injury] is not a risk of the same magnitude as an airplane or train
wreck, or a gas pipeline or nuclear power plant disaster.""23 The majority in
Acton inexplicably lowered this threshold and did not adhere to precedent
when it approved the Policy.
The majority held that athletes have a lower expectation of privacy than
other students. This holding is flawed because a student-athlete does not lose
his or her privacy by playing sports, in the way a railroad employee or a U.S.
Customs Service agent may expect a deprivation of their privacy. Moreover,
Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n and Von Raab require a compelling interest,
despite a lower expectation of privacy. Without a compelling interest, the
District's Policy does not pass constitutional muster. As the dissent correctly
pointed out, nothing in the record demonstrated that a drug problem existed in
the grade school James Acton attended. The evidence, therefore, did not sup-
port the majority's reasoning as it applied to James Acton.
Even assuming arguendo that a drug problem did exist in the middle
school, one of the most glaring flaws in the Court's reasoning is that the Poli-
cy ultimately does not address the problem. Again, the District's interest is in
discipline and athletic safety, not criminal enforcement of alcohol and narcot-
ics laws. This is clearly distinguishable from the government's interest in
T.L.O., where the principal was clearly looking for evidence of criminal activi-
ty so that he could turn the evidence and student over to police."' Although
illegal alcohol and drug use may have caused the discipline and safety prob-
lems claimed by District officials, the Policy was created out of disciplinary
and safety concerns, not out of concern over the substances themselves. Only
229. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
230. Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 23 F.3d 1514, 1526 (9th Cir. 1994); see International
Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 1245 v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 966 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1992)
(involving drug testing in the nuclear power industry); Bluestein v. Skinner, 908 F.2d 451 (9th
Cir.) (involving random drug testing of airline personnel with safety responsibilities), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 1083 (1991); International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 1245 v. Skinner, 913 F.2d 1454
(9th Cir. 1990) (involving random drug testing of employees working with natural gas, liquified
natural gas, and hazardous liquid pipelines).
231. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 328-29.
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when District officials recognized that student drug use triggered disruptive
behavior did the District decide to implement the Policy.232
Furthermore, although the dissent warned the Court about casting away
established constitutional principles based on public policy concerns, it appears
as though the majority did exactly that.233 Masking their own policy goal of
furthering the "War on Drugs" behind an interest in promoting discipline and
athletic safety in the Vernonia School District, the Court succumbed to politi-
cal pressures." 4 Instead of adhering to established precedent, the majority
approved a policy which allowed school officials to "engage in a 'fishing
expedition' for drug and alcohol use [in furtherance of] a moral crusade.2 35
Perhaps the most distressing aspect of Justice Scalia's majority opinion is
his vehement departure from his dissent in Von Raab.236 While at first this
departure appears chameleon-like, it becomes obvious upon deeper reflection,
that Justice Scalia's change in position reflects merely a distinction between
searches imposed on adults and those imposed on children. In Von Raab,
Justice Scalia found that making an adult employee urinate into a testing jar
was a constitutionally impermissible "invasion of their privacy and affront to
their dignity"; however, in the context of children, he finds the same drug
testing so admirable that he is willing to write a majority opinion espousing its
virtue. In Justice Scalia's eyes, drug testing of a person's urine is an unconsti-
tutional intrusive search when applied to an adult. When applied to a child, it
is converted into a disciplinary necessity. The rights of children are suppressed
while the rights of adults are exalted. This follows a general trend in our coun-
try to criminalize the conduct of children.237
232. Acton v. Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 796 F. Supp. 1354, 1357-58 (D. Or. 1992).
233. See Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2402.
234. As one commentator remarked:
[Tihe largely conservative ideology of the justices is matched by their views of the
judiciary's role in society. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Antonin
Scalia, among others, have spoken about the importance of leaving contentious issues to
the political branches of government, at the federal level and below.
Focusing on what [cases] the Court is not taking may miss the far more important
fact that sometimes the justices set an agenda by concentrating attention on only a hand-
ful of key cases.
That concentration happened during the 1994-95 term, when the court's conserva-
tive majority set the agenda for the entire term by shrewdly selecting a half-dozen key
cases at the start of the term.
Among the . . .petitions granted by the Court at the start of the 1994-95 term
that produced decisions favored by conservatives [was] .. .Vernonia School District v.
Acton.
David G. Savage, Docket Reflects Ideological Shifts: Shrinking Caseload, Cert Denials Suggest an
Unfolding Agenda, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1995, at 40, 40, 42.
235. Acton, 796 F. Supp. at 1363.
236. For a discussion of Justice Scalia's dissent in Von Raab, see supra note 86.
237. This is evidenced by juvenile facilities which mirror the environment in prisons, and the
overwhelming support for imposing stiffer sentences on juveniles:
The sentencing guidelines do not apply to a defendant sentenced under the Federal Juve-
nile Delinquency Act. However, the sentence imposed upon a juvenile delinquent may
not exceed the maximum of the guideline range applicable to an otherwise similarly
situated adult defendant unless the court finds an aggravating factor sufficient to warrant
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IV. CONCLUSION
In declaring the Vernonia School District's random, suspicionless, urinaly-
sis drug testing policy constitutional, the majority stripped James Acton and
other students seeking to participate in athletics of their legitimate expectations
of privacy and security under the Fourth Amendment. Drug abuse is an over-
whelmingly important societal problem that faces our entire nation. The Court,
however, did not follow established precedent; rather, it based its decision on
its own public policy view. Despite the Court's long held position that chil-
dren do not "shed their constitutional rights ... at the schoolhouse gate," '238
this decision nonetheless demonstrates the Court's willingness to deny students
the full protection of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights.
Joaquin G. Padilla
an upward departure from that guideline range. Therefore, a necessary step in ascertain-
ing the maximum sentence that may be imposed upon a juvenile delinquent is the deter-
mination of the guideline range that would be applicable to a similarly situated adult
defendant.
See United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, § I B 1.12 (Nov. 1995); see also
Elaine R. Jones, The Failure of the "Get Tough" Crime Policy, 20 U. DAYTON L. REv. 803 (1995)
(discussing the shortfalls of implementing a "Get Tough" Policy in the United States); Barry
Krisberg et al., What Works with Juvenile Offenders?: A Review of "Graduated Sanction" Pro-
grams, 10 CrIM. JUST. 20 (1995) (examining various programs adopted around the country which
have studied the issue of juvenile offenders and the appropriate response to the problems raised by
this issue); George B. Smith & Gloria M. Dabiri, The Judicial Role in the Treatment of Juvenile
Delinquents, 3 J.L. & POL'Y 347, 360-65 (1995) (discussing how public perceptions concerning
juvenile crime have generated a public sentiment toward "getting tough"). "These new laws and
policies have included prosecuting younger children as adults for certain crimes, as well as im-
posing mandatory, longer and more restrictive placements of adjudicated delinquents and other
young offenders." Id. One commentator questioned the effect on the entire juvenile justice sysyem:
In recent years, many states have enacted laws specifically addressing the problem of
serious and habitual juvenile crime. Several prominant commentators have interpreted
this trend as an indication that society has rejected the juvenile court's traditional philos-
ophy of rehabilitation in favor of more punitive, offense-oriented sanctions, and some
have concluded that recent changes call into question the very viability of the juvenile
court system.
Julianne P. Sheffer, Note, Serious and Habitual Juvenile Offender Statutes: Reconciling Punish-
ment and Rehabilitation Within the Juvenile Justice System, 48 VAND. L. REv. 479, 481 (1995);
see also Keep the Receiving Home Closed, WASH. POST, Aug. 19, 1995, at A20; Guy Kelly,
ACLU Files Suit over Youth Center, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Dec. 10, 1994, at 4A; Guy Kelly, Youth
Facility Bursting at the Seams, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Sept. 9, 1993, at 16A; Nancy Lewis, Much of
D.C. Youth Facility Without Hot Water, WASH. POST, Sept. 23, 1995, at B3. Cf. Barry C. Feld,
Violent Youth and Public Policy: A Case Study of Juvenile Justice Law Reform, 79 MINN. L. REV.
965, 1006-13 (1995) (reviewing the process of certifying juveniles for adult criminal prosecution);
Catherine R. Guttnan, Listen to the Children: The Decision to Transfer Juveniles to Adult Court,
30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 507 (1995) (reviewing the legal and policy implications of the recent
wave of juvenile transfer laws). See generally Mark Curriden, Hard Times for Bad Kids, A.B.A.
J., Feb. 1995, at 66 (examining the problems associated with the increase in juvenile crime, and
the different responses to these issues).
238. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
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